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Peace Studies at Manchester University | Plowshares | Indianapolis Peace Institute | Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace
  Volume 34   November 2007 


The Rebellion of the Forajidos: The Movement to Overthrow President Lucio Gutiérrez

by Benjamin Leiter


Ecuadorians have a history of rebelliousness. Three popular uprisings have resulted in eight presidents over the past 10 years. It was no surprise then, when former President Lucio Gutiérrez started acting up, that Ecuadorians responded accordingly. During the week of April 13-20, 2005 the people of Quito organized and held spontaneous nonviolent demonstrations that quickly and effectively culminated in the removal of Lucio Gutiérrez from office. While popular uprisings are fairly common in Quito, the Rebellion of the Forajidos, as this one was known, hardly qualified as a standard Ecuadorian insurrection. The lack of central leadership, the spontaneity of organizing, and the rapid achievement of the movement’s goals all uniquely characterize this case study in nonviolent political change.

The Driving Forces
During the days of protest that led to Lucio Gutiérrez’s fall, the city of Quito abandoned routine complacency and realized the enormous power available through massive nonviolent action. For many Ecuadorians, it was about time. Gutiérrez, who had campaigned as a leftist and friend to the indigenous people, reneged on platform promises and privatized basic services, increased Ecuador's International Monetary Fund debt, and endorsed the exploitation of indigenous land for oil. If that was not enough, in December of 2004 Gutiérrez, fulfilling a deal after forming a political alliance, used a temporary majority in Congress to dissolve the Supreme Court and appoint justices affiliated with parties supportive of him and his new alliance. While Gutiérrez claimed that the court had been packed with political enemies, the real reasons behind this unconstitutional political maneuver emerged when the new president of the court canceled charges against exiled former President Abdalá Bucaram in late March 2005, permitting him to return after eight years in Panama. Mild but massive demonstrations had been held in Quito and Guayaquil during January and February to express disapproval of the judicial crisis; however, it was Abdalá Bucaram’s safe return in early April that provided the impetus for consistent and effective action again the regime. As president, Bucaram had embarrassed Ecuador by performing pop concerts with scantily clad women, declaring Ecuadorian-born Lorena Bobbitt a national hero, and embezzling millions of dollars of public funds. His return was the final straw. Ecuadorians had had enough.

A Burgeoning Resistance
Several days of scattered but persistent demonstrations ensued. On April 5, some 5,000 people gathered outside the National Congress to demonstrate against Bucaram's return and the unconstitutional court.1 They were, however, quickly dispersed with tear gas and police violence. A few days later, the Quito Citizens’ Assembly was set up, presided by Mayor Paco Moncayo and authorities from six provinces. The Assembly, which was calling for an appropriate method to name a new court, organized an indefinite strike which was to begin on April 13 and end when its demands were met.

By Wednesday, April 13, Congress was unable to solve the problem of the court and the strike went ahead as planed. With public transportation, education and local government buildings closed, Quito was nearly paralyzed. Demonstrations were strewn throughout the city. The mayor of Quito along with other civil society groups gathered in a plaza to read the constitution out loud. A group of 400 indigenous people met in a park to speak out against the government. University students gathered in the Cultural Center. Other protests occurred in the north of the city where demonstrators blockaded roads with large rocks. While the mayor attempted to unite many of these diverse groups into a single march, he was unsuccessful.2 As a result, the strike lacked adequate leadership and many analysts predicted that it could not continue throughout the week as originally planned. That evening the government celebrated its triumph over the Quito Assembly and declared the strike a failure. Paco Velasco, the director of Radio La Luna recalls how, that evening, “Gutiérrez commended the people of Quito for choosing stability over chaos, for choosing to work instead of protest.”3

However, as the government discounted the provincial strike, a popular discontent was brewing devoid of any political party, leader, or assembly. La Luna (Spanish for “moon”), a progressive radio station based in Quito, opened its microphones to the public that day so the people could express their opinions over the air. Paco Velasco recounts that on the evening of April 13 a middle-aged woman called into the station at 7:00 p.m. to express her anger at the official government line. “I went to work,” she exclaimed, “but not to support the regime. I want to propose that we protest after work hours.” She suggested that everyone go out into the streets with their pots and pans at night and asked La Luna to hold a countdown to 9:00 p.m.4 More calls quickly came into the radio station supporting this idea and offering others. Hence a rough strategy was quickly formed.

People eagerly responded to the call for nocturnal, self-organized action. El Comercio writes that from 9:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. that night 5,000 men, women, and children gathered at Los Shyris, a central avenue in the northern part of the city. Five thousand more marched to the Supreme Court building.5 Individual neighborhoods held smaller protests. All over the city demonstrators gathered to bang their pots and pans, wave their Ecuadorian flags, and call for Gutiérrez’s removal. While the strike earlier that day may have failed, few could deny that a more powerful movement had been born. Lucio Gutiérrez was in for a week of self-organized, nonviolent protests that revealed the clear purpose of determined constituency.

Naming the Movement
It was clear that Gutiérrez was losing his grip on power. In a quintessential display of political jujitsu, nearly every move he made to discount the swelling demonstrations was used against him. On Thursday Gutiérrez named the movement that would later topple him. Energized by the protests from the night before, hundreds of demonstrators visited Gutiérrez’s personal home in the early morning hours of April 14. El Comercio reported that Gutiérrez emerged from a balcony and dismissed the disruptive protestors as a bunch of forajidos or “outlaws.”6 The story quickly spread and on Friday April 15 the movement had a name: the Rebellion of the Forajidos. With t-shirts, bumper stickers, posters, and graffiti, thousands of people declared, “I am a forajido too.” It seemed as if nearly everyone in Quito was an outlaw – if that meant being against the Gutiérrez government.

A State of Emergency
The next few days deteriorated for the regime. The Thursday night protests began with a simultaneous explosion of balloons. After the “big bang,” 10,000 demonstrators, mostly house wives with their children and elderly people, marched from Los Shyris to the houses of officials associated with the government and the court.7 The following night, protestors wielded cutting boards and wooden spoons. As close to 15,000 people banged their kitchenware in Los Shyris to call for Gutiérrez’s removal, confusion spread throughout the crowd.8 Lucio Gutiérrez was declaring a state of emergency and announcing the dissolution of the Supreme Court on national television. Even though the pro-government court had initially prompted public outrage, many Ecuadorians viewed its dissolution by the president as yet another autocratic action. Instead of panicking or dispersing, the crowd remained resolute, sang the national anthem, and waved their national flags more vigorously.9 The citizens of Quito blatantly disobeyed the state of emergency that evening and continued to exercise their right to assemble. Because General Luis Aguas, commander of the Army, also opposed the state of emergency and refused to recognize it, Gutiérrez was forced to lift the decree the next day.10

Continued Protesting
Gutiérrez was losing ground. The military’s critical decision to ignore the state of emergency empowered the protesters and confirmed Gutiérrez’s tenuous hold on authority. Rumors were racing through the city suggesting that high level officials in the military were upset with how Gutiérrez was handling the crisis. However, the commander of the Ecuadorian equivalent to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Víctor Hugo Rosero, maintained his support for the Gutiérrez government.

Aware that Gutiérrez was not yet finished, citizen continued demonstrating. Radio La Luna, the voice of the movement, informed the public of the form of protest for Saturday April 16. “We are going to go out with a roll of toilet paper to show that, for us, all those in the Court, the Congress, and the Presidential Palace are just that.”11 Throughout the city, toilet paper hung from trees and covered cars. The central message was that the people of Quito were symbolically cleaning up all the corruption that the Gutiérrez government had created.

Massive demonstrations continued throughout the weekend in the midst of severe police repression and tear gas. But on Monday, as Paco Velasco tells it, La Luna called for an end to decentralized, local protests and suggested that the movement converge in a march to the Presidential Palace. Citizens heeded the call. On Tuesday April 19, over 100,000 citizens met in a park in the north of Quito and marched towards the Presidential Palace in the old city center.12 That night Gutiérrez ordered extreme repression of the peaceful demonstrators. One Chilean photographer was asphyxiated from the tear gas and later died. People were outraged, but at 2:00 a.m. everyone went home with the promise to return the next day.

The Final Day
At 6:00 a.m. on Wednesday there were reports in La Luna that people from the coast and the Amazon were promised a bag of flour, oatmeal and some tuna to come to Quito to confront the protestors.13 The city rose up. While political corruption was annoying, hiring thugs to purposely create confrontation and chaos was intolerable for most Quiteños. Those living on the outskirts of the city or close to major highways that led into Quito set up blockades using their own vehicles. When Quito Mayor Paco Moncayo heard of the busloads of counter-protesters heading to Quito he immediately ordered the closing of a major toll way. Trucks from the Public Works Company, city buses, pick-ups, and dump trucks all quickly blockaded the highway to keep out Gutiérrez supporters.14

At 10:00 a.m. the chief of police, Gen. Jorge Poveda, allegedly ran out of tear gas.15 Realizing the sheer size of the demonstrations and reluctant to be responsible for further repression, Poveda resigned an hour later. Referring to the police repression of the previous night, and the death of the Chilean photographer, Poveda left, saying, “I regret what happened yesterday. I cannot continue to be a witness to the confrontation with the Ecuadorian people. I am not a violent man.”16

Just as was the case one week before, the city was again paralyzed. Streets were blocked with flaming tires, busses were not running, schools were closed, and mob violence—due to clashes between protestors and counter-protestors—plagued several parts of the city. However, this time the people did not chose to work instead of protest. While unrest spread throughout the city, most demonstrators concentrated in the old city center and pushed toward the Plaza Grande, on which the Presidential Palace is located. At 12:50 p.m., seeking to avoid further repression, the military squads that had prevented the protestors from entering the Plaza Grande withdrew, abandoning the police that stood before the crowd.17

By this time, Gutiérrez had lost virtually all legitimacy. Aware that demonstrators pushing toward the Presidential Palace faced very minimal resistance, Congress acted. Sixty members of Congress (out of 62 present) voted to remove the president from office on grounds of “abandoning the position.” According to Congress, Lucio Gutiérrez had failed to fulfill his constitutional duties as president. They declared the position vacant and swore in Vice-president Alfredo Palacio. Directly following Gutiérrez’s removal, the military officially withdrew their support for the ousted president. Victor Hugo Rosero, head of the joint chiefs of staff, announced the decision. “We cannot remain indifferent before the pronouncements of the Ecuadorian people. In this scenario of anarchy, the military high command ... has been forced to make the hard decision of withdrawing support from the constitutional president in order to protect public safety and recover peace and tranquility.”18

At 2:00 p.m., Gutiérrez succumbed to the advancing mass of dissenters and the disintegrating pillars of support and fled the Presidential Palace. Unlike former disposed Ecuadorian presidents Gutiérrez did not easily get away. According to Velasco, La Luna broadcast his move over the radio and protestors broke into the Mariscal Sucre International Airport. They took over the central control tower and began searching the planes for Gutiérrez. Hundreds of people flooded the runway, eliminating any chance for the toppled president to escape the country. Consequently, Gutiérrez re-boarded the helicopter and eventually found refuge in the Brazilian embassy, which granted him political asylum. Again, La Luna alerted the people of Gutiérrez’s location so they could continue to demonstrate, this time demanding that Gutiérrez be held accountable for his crimes.

However, newly appointed President Alfredo Palacio had begun to calm the dispersing crowds and many demonstrators began celebrating their victory. While factions of the movement wanted to continue to push for political reforms to bring about more lasting change, most saw the removal of the president as the primary objective and were content to return home once this had been accomplished. The movement’s momentum soon dissipated and relative political and social stability returned to Quito.

The Role of Resistance Radio
The media plays a critically important role in conducting any social movement. For Gandhi’s India it was newspapers; for the forajidos it was radio. In general, radio differs from other forms of media. It is portable, easily accessible, and allows for immediate communication. The unique characteristics of radio helped form the spontaneous and leaderless nature of the forajido rebellion. However, not just any radio station could have played such a fundamental role in such a movement. It had to be La Luna.

In the mid-1990s Paco Velasco and Ataúlfo Tobar opened an alternative radio station through the nongovernmental organization Popular Education Center. Their vision was to wake people up; their slogan read, “our style is not silence.” The idea was to run an independent station unfettered by political or corporate affiliations so as to be able to report truthfully and criticize freely. By doing so they hoped to encourage people to become active participants in Ecuadorian society. La Luna played a key role in the overthrow of President Abdalá Bucaram in 1997 and it also supported protests against President Jamil Mahauad in 2000. Tobar jokes that “people think it’s a weird radio station, but everyone listens when they’re working to overthrow a government.” In April 2005, La Luna played its largest role yet in the ouster of a president. The station became a place for citizens to vent frustration, a forum for organizing, a moderator of a city-wide discussion, and a leader. Without La Luna there would not have been a Rebellion of the Forajidos.

Consistent with their mission to engage the citizenry, La Luna has maintained an open mic policy since it was first founded. However, people most often take advantage of the opportunity to go on the air during a social or political crisis. Throughout the April 2005 protests, lines of up to 300 people crowded the station’s stair well and snaked into the street. Those who could not travel to the station, called. La Luna provided droves of indignant citizens a channel through which to publicly voice their frustration with the government. Disjointed catharsis soon converged into a cohesive conversation and La Luna became the forum for a city-wide discussion about the country’s political situation.

The forum for conversation naturally evolved into a forum for organization when, on April 13, a caller suggested that people take to the streets that night. The demonstration was a success and people quickly realized that protests could be convened without the direction of a charismatic leader or an established organization. Thousands of calls from people offering a parade of ideas for actions against the government flooded the phone lines in the following days. Ideas ranged from the simple clanging of a pot in the window of every household, to holding a massive demonstration in the avenue Shyris. La Luna became a spawning ground of creativity. One caller suggested an action in which anyone who found themselves in their vehicle at twelve noon should stop where they were and honk their horn for five minutes.

With a plethora of resistance tactics and amateur social movement strategies showering the radio station, and no official leadership to make definite tactical decisions, Paco Velasco assumed the role of moderator of the forum. Velasco and his staff received information from hundreds of citizen journalists regarding when and where smaller actions against the government were being held and related this information to listeners. The Washington Post reported that during the week of unrest, La Luna directed people to an estimated 200 protests.

Some of the directions they provided were more specific than others. The Post also noted that during the April 20 march to the old city center, La Luna helped protestors moving toward the presidential palace to avoid police barricades and street closures. Because radios are easily portable, the ability for people to carry with them at all times their main source of information regarding the movement greatly contributed to the spontaneous nature of the protests. Whether they were in their home, car, or even walking the street, dedicated demonstrators were able to remain constantly on call, ready to attend to the next action. For the radio station, making the information continually available was a tireless task. In order to keep the public informed and the microphones open, La Luna, with the help of volunteers, staffed the station practically 24 hours a day.

Velasco, however, did not limit himself to announcing the location and time of demonstrations; he also sought to shape a mature and effective movement. On several occasions, Velasco called for peaceful protests and commended the people of Quito for using nonviolence. In another instance he called for the consolidation of smaller protests into one united march to the presidential palace. It was appropriate for Velasco to assume this momentary leadership role, at times subtle and at other time pivotal. Not only did Velasco likely possess one of the keenest understandings of the movement in all of Quito—due to his extensive reporting on the situation—but he was also a seasoned activist. He recognized the strategic value of nonviolence and was able to accurately assess the need for more forceful, united action.  

While hardly the sole leader of the movement, La Luna certainly served as a forum for organizing, assumed the role of moderating a complex discussion, realized the important task of disseminating information, and occasionally nudged the people toward a successful strategy.

Characteristics of Movement
There are many aspects of the Forajido Rebellion that deserve further analysis and exploration. Among them are the intergenerational nature of the protests, the lack of resistance activity outside of Quito, the use of cell phones as recruiting tools, and the role of women. Two of the most unique, and perhaps important, characteristics of the movement, however, are the spontaneity of the nonviolent action and the lack of central leadership. While contrary to traditional social movement theory, these characteristics possess significant advantages.

When the mayor of Quito and other provincial authorities failed to execute an effective strike on April 13, the citizens of Quito led the resistance. Popular participation in the organizing process translated to increased popular participation in anti-government actions. Understanding that no politician or assembly was formally in charge of organizing demonstrations or marshaling participants, people were empowered to perform such tasks themselves. Many of those who attended the protests were encouraged to participate by friends or family members. Text messages, phone calls, and conversations from loved ones proved more effective in drawing people to the streets than stirring speeches from politicians. As previously mentioned, hundreds of people contacted La Luna to contribute to the organizing effort. The plentiful and diverse minds involved in the planning not only resulted in an array of creative tactics used throughout the week, but helped insure wide participation in the events. In the forajido rebellion popular involvement in the organizing process likely caused people to be more dedicated to the movement and have a greater interest in its success.

Because people were calling for the demonstrations themselves, they tended to hold protests in the most convenient locations for them, which often meant their own neighborhoods. While sizeable demonstrations were held at the avenue Shyris, a central and easily accessible street in the north of the city, many smaller demonstrations were convened elsewhere. Both the proximity of these smaller protests to peoples’ homes and the presence of familiar faces became initial incentives to attend. When the smaller protests converged later on, people were already committed to the movement and perhaps much more willing to attend larger, unified demonstrations. Another advantage of widespread demonstrations was the fact that the police were unable to repress them all. A single, united rally is easier to disperse than fifteen smaller rallies in various parts of the city.

Local protests also were also organized on the spur of the moment, leading the media to refer to them as spontaneous. A small group of people with pots and pans would multiply over the course of the evening. For larger protests people often had only a few hours notice before a demonstration began. Once gathered, participants would sometimes on impulse decide to march to the Congress or to the Supreme Court. This element of surprise made it difficult for the police to monitor and contain protestors.

Another advantage of spontaneity is the ability to capitalize on raw emotion and energy. People were extremely upset with the government. To spend the time and resources on traditional organizing (e.g. forming a leadership committee, procuring funds, garnering political support etc.) would have stolen momentum and energy from a population ready to act. According to social movement theorists Piven and Cloward, this drive to act and be disruptive is the main source of power among movements of the poor.19 Furthermore, by quickly achieving the movement’s goals, participants did not lose interest or stamina. In an intense, high energy movement such as the Forajido Rebellion, extensive organization building would have hindered more than helped the struggle.

The spontaneity and leaderless nature of the resistance did not, of course, come without disadvantages. The main drawback was the inability to create a long-term strategy. People were frustrated with Gutiérrez, but also with the rest of the country’s politicians. While Gutiérrez was the chief symbol of political corruption in the country, he was not the source of the problem. He was only the product of it. Many in the movement wanted all governmental officials—from the congress to the courts—to be removed. They called for the reform of the entire political system. To remove Gutiérrez without any additional changes would still preserve conditions for another corrupt president to emerge in a few years. No one, however, could articulate how to attack the root of the problem and improve the overall political structure. The movement succeeded in removing a corrupt president, but it did not form even the beginnings of a plan to eliminate corruption.

Despite its shortcomings the Forajido Rebellion left an important legacy. In the short-term, the movement held Lucio Gutiérrez accountable for his abuses of power. People power provided a check in a political system where checks and balances rarely function effectively. The movement, by making an example of Gutiérrez, cautioned other politicians against the potential consequences of corruption and social neglect.

Unintended long-term consequences were also significant. After Gutiérrez’s ouster, Alfredo Palacio was appointed president and returned the country to the leftist agenda abandoned by Gutiérrez. Palacio, a physician turned politician, increased social spending, distanced himself from Washington, and appointed left-leaning, IMF critic Rafael Correa as economy minister. During his short tenure in the Palacio administration Correa enjoyed high approval ratings, made frequent media appearances, and articulated a progressive vision for the nation. Although Correa resigned after a few months, his time as economy minister was, nevertheless, a strategic step to his bid for the presidency. Correa eventually won the 2006 presidential elections, pledging to fight corruption, not renew the agreement permitting the U.S. base in Manta, reject the free trade pact with the United States, and use oil money to fight poverty…all of which were concerns of the Forajido Rebellion. In September 2007 Correa won a constituent assembly with the intention to formalize some of the drastic political changes called for by the movement. What was not achieved in the streets in 2005 was eventually brought about by the ballot box in 2007. Correa is not Ecuador’s savior by any means, but he is a reason to hope for many Ecuadorians.

Is This Model Replicable?
Several external factors which contributed to the success of the Forajido Rebellion may also limit the extent to which this model could be replicated. First, the regime was politically weak. Gutiérrez, in addition to facing harsh criticism from various fronts, lacked even the support of his Vice President, Alfredo Palacio. The less credibility a ruler has the more credibility an opposition movement enjoys. Second, overall repression of demonstrators was minimal. The police and the military selectively obeyed orders and limited repression to tear gas, rubber bullets, and high pressure fire hoses. As a result, repression was not severe enough to suppress the movement and instead discredited the government. The two deaths and 417 wounded in 15 days serve as a reminder of the repression that was carried out.20 However, a more brutal regime, such as the one in Myanmar today, while not impossible to resist nonviolently, likely demands a more organized, strategic effort with both more endurance and resolve. Third, there is a tradition of accessibility to the seat of power in Latin America that does not exist in much of the developed world. In Ecuador the Presidential quarters are located in the central part of the city, bordering a popular and often crowed plaza. Such intimacy in times of stability translates to accessibility in times of crisis. While mobs of protestors have never flooded the halls of congress or the White House in Washington, D.C., such situations pose a more serious threat for Ecuadorian politicians. In a place where the seat of power is neither easily accessible nor centrally concentrated, more planning is likely required to identify means of targeting the opponent’s weaknesses.

While every movement for nonviolent change must account for local variables and conditions, tactics and strategies are often replicable. Many of the tactics that the forajidos utilized could be tested by other nonviolent campaigns. The use of radio, increased citizen participation in the planning process, night-time demonstrations, spontaneous action, and neighborhood activism are all examples. One of the most salient lessons of the Forajido Rebellion, however, is that of nonviolent intervention. Ecuadorians filled the streets, halted transportation, occupied an airport, and ultimately paralyzed a city. They risked repression and injury to artfully disrupt business as usual; and their disruption did not go unnoticed. Such determination to act with courage for justice is a challenge for adherents to nonviolence around the world.

Popularly organized, spontaneous movements that bring about dramatic political change are rare. When examining cases of nonviolent political or social change it is much more common to learn of struggles that last years, not weeks. Usually, much more strategic planning and careful organizing is required to garner the influence and momentum to topple a high-level figure such as a president. But in this case, one week was enough, and perhaps even a strength. Nonviolent action took the government by surprise and before Gutiérrez could develop an effective response to the movement, he had been deposed.

Gutiérrez committed a fairly common mistake. He misjudged the power of nonviolence. Though the works of Gene Sharp, Peter Ackerman, and many others have legitimized nonviolence by portraying it as an effective tool to resolve conflict, most leaders of the world do not recognize nonviolence as a serious threat to their power. Despite the countless examples of successful nonviolent struggles, most people continue to place their faith in violence. Had the 150,000 forajidos taken up arms in April 2005, Gutiérrez would have immediately recognized the threat and responded with deadly force. Instead, people used nonviolence and Gutiérrez decided to ride out the protests, order limited repression, and hope the tumult would soon pass. Nonviolence has yet to permeate the public imagination, in part because the media still largely ignores it and intellectuals are just beginning to study it. The lack of confidence in nonviolence prevents those who disregard it from fully assessing its potential. While this may appear to be an advantage at times, such a mentality has frightening consequences. A world in which those same leaders lacked confidence in violence would be much more secure. Therefore, may the Forajido Rebellion be a reminder of the enormous power available through nonviolent action, a power that ultimately rests in the hands of the people, not the politicians.

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Ben Leiter ('06) is the Peace Studies Research Associate at Manchester University. He spent his junior year abroad in Quito, Ecuador, where he witnessed the week of protests that overthrew President Lucio Gutiérrez. He will spend the 2008 year studying international relations in Caracas, Venezuela through a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship.

End Notes

1. El Comercio, “Bucaram: su regreso desata la protesta,” April 6, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=124223&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=6.

2. El Comercio, “Manifestaciones dispersas e inconexas en distintos puntos de Quito,” April 13, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125018&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=13.

3. Paco Velasco, interview with author, March 5, 2007.

4. Ibid.

5. El Comercio, “Las manifestaciones continuaron anoche en Quito,” April 14, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125119&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=14.

6. El Comercio, “La protesta de este día es el ‘rollazo’,” April 16, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125324&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=16.

7. El Comercio, “Intensa protesta nocturna en Quito,” April 15, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125242&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=15.

8. El Comercio, “El decreto encendió la protesta en Los Shyris,” April 16, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125357&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=16.

9. Ibid.

10. El Comercio, “El Ejército se resistió al decreto de emergencia,” April 16, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125355&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=16.

11. El Comercio, “La protesta de este día es el ‘rollazo’,” April 16, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125324&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=16.

12. El Comercio, “Quito: marcha y represión,” April 20, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=125774&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=20.

13. Paco Velasco.

14. Monte Hayes, “Ecuador Lawmakers Vote to Remove Gutierrez,” Associated Press, April 20, 2005, http://www.soaw.org/newswire_detail.php?id=820.

15. Paco Velasco

16. Ibid.

17. El Comercio, “Carondelet: en menos de dos horas se definió el drama ayer,” April 21, 2005, sec. A3.

18. Monte Hayes.

19. Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward, Poor Peoples Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail.(New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

20. El Comercio, “La Cruz Roja atendió a 417 personas en 15 días,” April 22, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=126004&anio=2005&mes=4&dia=22.






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